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1 Introduction
The way the private sector’s economic decisions respond to changes in monetary policy
and to the communication of such changes is of primary interest for policy makers and
economists. In standard economic theory based on rational expectations, agents optimally
and promptly react to any change in the economic environment. In reality, however, the
responses of private agents’ consumption and investment to policy changes may vary greatly,
depending on how much attention people pay to the monetary policy environment. For
instance, in periods of relative stability, agents may delay or not respond at all to policy
changes that are deemed small or unimportant to them. By contrast, in turbulent times, more
of their attention may be devoted to tracking changes in the monetary policy environment,
and erratic behavioral responses of consumption and investment can be observed while agents
parse information about economic conditions.
These behavioral patterns can be captured by models in which agents exhibit limited
cognitive ability to process information about the economic environment, as in the Rational
Inattention theory introduced by Sims (2006, 2003). In contrast with the rational expectations
paradigm, the rational inattention structure is less concerned about how much information
should, or should not, be released by the policy maker to the public, but rather focuses on
whether and when the information released elicits significant behavioral reactions. Rational
inattention encompasses full-information as the limiting case in which agents have infinite
information processing capacity.
This paper explores the response of consumption and saving decisions of individuals
to changes in monetary policy in a laboratory experiment. We first propose a model
where rationally inattentive agents face monetary policy changes, and we derive testable
implications of consumption and investment choices in response to them. We then design
a laboratory experiment with induced inattention to test these implications in a controlled
environment, contrasting the predictions of our rational inattention model to those derived
under full information. We find strong support for the rational inattention model from the
experimental evidence.
Building on the rational inattention literature, we develop a 2-period model where an
agent receives an endowment in the first period and decides how to allocate it between
consumption and savings. Savings are invested in a one-period bond, which pays a return in
the second period given by the prevailing short-term interest rate set by the monetary policy
authority. The agent is rationally inattentive and the interest rate is not fully observed
because she has limited cognitive capacity to process information about it and her prior
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is uninformative over possible realization of the interest rate. The decision problem of the
agent amounts to choosing how much information she wants to process about the interest
rate functional to her choice of consumption and investment (savings) in the asset.
We postulate a quadratic functional form for the agent’s utility. This assumption implies
a subdued response to changes in the interest rate, as these have limited impact on lifetime
utility.1 With quadratic utility, and given distributional assumptions for the interest rate,
we can fully characterize the closed-form solution of the model and derive a set of theoretical
predictions to be taken to the laboratory and tested against the full-information outcome.
We trace a tight mapping between the theoretical framework and the experimental design.
The experimental subjects receive a fixed endowment and choose among lotteries with
uncertain outcomes – which depend on the realization of the policy rate. These lotteries
match the lifetime utility profiles of the theoretical model under uncertainty about the
investment returns (interest rates). Subjects begin the task with a uniform prior on the
lottery payoffs, but can reduce uncertainty about the outcomes by solving real-effort cognitive
tasks. Different difficulty levels of these tasks capture the increasing cognitive effort required
by the subjects to acquire more informative signals and process more information about the
interest rate.2
Three main findings emerge from our analysis. First, we show that the behavior of the
subjects in our experiment is generally consistent with the predictions of limited attention to
interest rate tracking and the consumption choices of the rational inattentive (RI) representative
agent. More importantly, the experimental data allows us to formally compare the fit of
the rationally inattentive model to the model in which agents make decisions under full
information (FI). FI predictions are generally statistically rejected by subjects’ consumption
choices, but the RI predictions are not. Participants behave as if they have limited information
processing capacity rather than full information, which would make them rapidly and precisely
react to changes in the economic environment, as postulated by rational expectations models
with infinite processing capacity.
The rationale for the RI theoretical prediction is that utility gains from processing more
information do not provide a sufficient compensation for the cognitive effort of precisely
tracking the interest rate. The agents prefer to increase consumption in the first period –
1While invoked mainly for analytical tractability, this assumption is backed by the empirical findings of
Bachmann et al. (2015) and Roth and Wohlfart (2019), for instance, who show muted behavioral responses
of households to changes in monetary policy.
2Given that Rational Inattention theory is based on cognitive effort rather than time spent executing a
number of tasks, these cognitive tasks are more suitable to gauge the difficulty subjects overcome in gathering
and processing information (as shown in Civelli and Deck, 2018).
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which requires little information on interest rate – and reduce savings. This is true even if,
on average, a more informed subject receives a higher utility reward. This result has a stark
monetary policy implication: if people’s utility functions make deviations of interest rates
policy unimportant to them, interest rate changes are unlikely to elicit significant behavioral
reactions. Moreover, both the theoretical and the experimental findings corroborate the
empirical evidence in U.S. and international data of a relatively small impact of monetary
policy on households’ decisions (as pointed out by Roth and Wohlfart, 2019).
Second, we investigate the effectiveness of forward guidance in affecting behavioral choices.
Following Campbell et al. (2012), we identify two forms of forward guidance: Delphic and
Odyssean forward guidance.3 In the experiment we implement Delphic forward guidance as
a reduction in the volatility of the interest rate, while we model Odyssean forward guidance
as a commitment by the central bank to provide a more predictable path of the interest rate.
As noted by Campbell et al. (2012), interpreting Delphic forward guidance as reduction
in the interest rate volatility would be consistent with the solution for the policy rate of
an optimal control problem with a quadratic loss function as in Taylor (1993), where the
volatility of the interest rate directly influences private sector’s welfare.4 In our framework,
this policy lowers the cognitive cost associated with the tracking of the interest rate. As a
consequence, the RI representative agent makes more deliberate and precise consumption
and investment decisions in response to changes in the monetary policy stance, which also
lead to a material welfare improvement relative to the full-information case.
We find experimental subjects respond to this treatment as predicted by the theory,
enjoying higher utility when this form of forward guidance is adopted. Subjects’ behavior in
the laboratory is measurably closer to the predictions of the RI model than the prediction
of the FI model in this case as well.
On the contrary, for the Odyssen forward guidance, we find that a commitment by the
central bank to provide a predictable path of the interest rate via a 90% accurate signal on
the policy stance has no material effect on consumption and information choices of both the
RI representative agent and the experiment subjects. As a result, the effect on welfare from
this policy is negligible.
These theoretical and experimental results on the efficacy of Delphic and Odyssean
3As described in Campbell et al. (2012), Delphic forward guidance refers to communication of the central
bank about the economic outlook, whereas Odyssean forward guidance refers to a commitment of the central
bank to keep rates stable, see Eggertsson and Woodford (2003).
4Among the papers that implement this type of Delphic forward guidance, see Gaballo (2016), Melosi
(2016) and Ehrmann et al. (2019).
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forward guidance are also strongly supported by the empirical literature that uses U.S.
and cross-country data on aggregate consumption and investment (Andrade and Ferroni,
2018; McKay et al., 2016; Campbell et al., 2019; Ehrmann et al., 2019). To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first paper to provide theoretical and laboratory evidence consistent
with these empirical findings.
As a third result, we show that a deterioration in the public perception of the economic
outlook given by a higher time discount factor dampens investment – i.e., increases consumption
in the first period – for a given information precision in both the RI theory and the experimental
data. This finding also agrees with the empirical evidence of, for instance, Roth and Wohlfart
(2019), Bachmann et al. (2015) and, more recently, Yagan (2019). The implication of this
finding is that the influence of monetary policy on private sector’s behavior not only depends
on the size of the change in the policy instrument, but also on the timing of the change along
the business cycle.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. After discussing related literature in the
second part of this section, Section 2 formally presents the theoretical decision problem under
rational inattention. It discusses the properties of the solution of the problem and lays out
the testable predictions. Section 3 introduces the experimental setting and the treatments
implemented to verify the theoretical predictions. A mapping between experimental set-
up and the theoretical model is formally established. Section 4 shows the congruence of
the experimental results with the theoretical predictions. Finally, Section 5 offers some
concluding remarks. Additional details and robustness checks are left to the Appendix.
1.1 Related Literature
This paper relates to two broadly defined areas of research. The first strand concerns the
importance of cognitive limits on economic decisions. While there is an extensive literature
documenting attention limits in economics,5 there has been significantly less research on
testing models of limited attention, and especially rational inattention, in an experimental
setting. Among the papers that empirically test attention limits, Caplin and Dean (2011)
tests a sequential search models where agents face a large number of alternatives. The
key difference between their paper and ours is that our subjects choose higher information
precision by solving progressively more difficult tasks so that the number of alternatives is
tightly linked to their cognitive effort.
5See, for instance, in the context of consumer choices: Chetty et al. (2009), Allcott and Taubinsky (2015),
Santos et al. (2012)
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Other papers study models of information acquisition and their impact on choices in
strategic settings when agents are not fully rational. In the experimental literature, Gabaix
et al. (2006), Khaw et al. (2016), and Goecke et al. (2013) study dynamic models of information
acquisition without assuming that subjects are rational. These papers focus mostly on
information acquisition, while our paper is centered around information processing, explicitly
connecting the acquisition of information to the cognitive cost of mapping that information
into behavioral choices.
The set of papers closest to our paper (Pinkofskiy, 2009; Cheremukhin et al., 2015; Dean
and Neligh, 2017; Civelli et al., 2018)) all use Shannon’s entropy costs as the basis of their
experimental analysis. Cheremukhin et al. (2015) exposes subjects to gambles in the lab to
estimate the cost of information processing as well as attitude to risk. Dean and Neligh (2017)
empirically tests the validity of rational inattention models under different specifications of
the information cost based on Shannon’s mutual information. Civelli et al. (2018) is the
closest to our paper as it employs cognitive tasks to explicitly map information acquisition
into consumption choices of risk averse subjects.
In contrast with the previous literature, in this paper, we abstract from considering risk
attitude and testing for alternative specifications of the rational inattention models. Instead,
we propose a model where monetary policy changes are the primary stimuli to the economic
environment that trigger changes in information processing. We encode the complexity of
deciphering monetary policy changes our experimental subjects face by associating progressively
more demanding cognitive tasks to signals providing sharper information. In this context,
we focus on how rationally inattentive subjects react to monetary policy variations, and
measure their information processing and consumption choices.
The second broad strand of the literature this paper relates to is on information frictions
and the signaling channel of monetary policy.6 In particular, a number of recent papers
empirically document the interaction between information rigidities, inflation expectations,
and monetary policy. Evidence based on surveys of firms (Kumar et al., 2015; Coibion
et al., 2019) show mixed effects of monetary policy on economic outcomes. With respect to
households’ expectations, Easaw et al. (2013), Roth and Wohlfart (2019), Bachmann et al.
(2015), Binder (2017), and Khaw et al. (2017) find changes in information acquisition that
relate to changes in behavioral choices.
In this paper, we track subjects’ information acquisition and processing directly together
6See Baeriswyl and Cornand (2010) and Melosi (2016) for examples of how interest rates serve as
communication tools from monetary policy to firms.
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with consumption choices. This way we are able to disentangle whether a particular change
in monetary policy trigger changes in information acquisition and consumption behavior.
Finally, the paper also relates to the recent debate on the relative effectiveness of Delphic
vs. Odyssean forward guidance of monetary policy.7 McKay et al. (2016) and Campbell et al.
(2019) both warn on the limits of forward guidance in affecting private sector’s behavior, with
Delphic forward guidance being more effective than Odyssean forward guidance in nudging
behavior when private sector expectations are not rational (as in Eusepi and Preston, 2018)
or firms are rationally inattentive (as in Gaballo, 2016).8
This paper provides experimental support for the theoretical findings of these papers by
showing that, while a central bank signal on the monetary policy stance (a form of Odyssean
forward guidance) is generally ineffective in influencing participants’ behavior in terms of
consumption and savings, a less volatile interest rate used as a tool of Delphic forward
guidance would modify consumption choices.
2 Theoretical Framework
This section introduces the theoretical framework of the RI model which provides the
structure for the experimental design and delivers the predictions we test in the laboratory.
We sketch the representative agent problem in the first part of this section, leaving more
details to Appendix A, while in the second part we specialize to a closed-form solution of
the general problem with quadratic utility. From this specification, we derive the model’s
predictions.
2.1 The Model
The model is a two-period consumption-saving optimization program which features a
rationally inattentive agent. In period 1, the agent receives an endowment of 1 unit of a
good, which can be either consumed or saved through investment in a one-period bond for
consumption in period 2. Let the bond return be defined by the interest rate r, and c1 and c2
denote consumption in the two periods respectively. We can express consumption in period
2 as: c2 = r(1− c1).
7As described in Campbell et al. (2012), Delphic forward guidance refers to communication of the central
bank about the outlook, whereas Odyssean forward guidance refers to a commitment of the central bank to
keep rates stable, see Eggertsson and Woodford (2003).
8Gaballo (2016) develops a Rational Inattention model with Delphic forward guidance in central banks
may be successful in changing firms’ pricing behavior.
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We postulate that the bond return is set by the monetary policy authority, but the
agent has limited information-processing capacity to process information about the interest
rate. The assumption of limited-information processing capacity is the core of the RI model.
In turn, it implies that before processing information about r, the agent considers c1 and
c2 as random variables since different realizations of the interest rate give rise to different
consumption options. Moreover, the RI framework implies that the decision of how much
information to process comes from the trade-off between the benefit of having more precise
information about r functional to consumption choices and the cognitive cost necessary to
process more information. The optimal balance between cost and benefit of information
processing that maximizes agent’s lifetime utility constitutes the solution of the RI model.
Following Tutino (2013) and Civelli et al. (2018), we assume the agent starts period 1
with a prior on distribution of the interest rate, g(r), and can reduce uncertainty about this
prior by acquiring signals on the interest rate, which mutually reduces uncertainty about her
consumption possibilities in period 1 and, implicitly, period 2.
The randomness of consumption and interest rate and their intertwined relation make
the relevant choice variable of the optimization problem under RI the joint probability
distribution of consumption and interest rate: p(c1, r). This joint distribution makes explicit
the mutual dependence that c1 and r have in the mind of the agent when she chooses how
much information to process to maximize her utility. Using Bayes’ rule, the choice of the
joint distribution can be thought of as a choice of the signal about r for a given c1.9
The optimal choice of p∗(c1, r) depends on the information processing capacity of the
agent. This aspect is embedded in the model by using principles of information theory.
Specifically, we assume that the mutual information flow between r and c1, I (p(c1, r)), is
bounded by a number, κ, which represents the maximum amount of information that can
be extracted from c1 about r. In practice, κ corresponds to the amount of information
that the agent can process about consumption and interest rate, and poses a limit on the
informational content of the signals that the agent can choose.10
Let u(ci) be standard twice continuously differentiable utility of the agent at periods
i = (1, 2), and 0 < β < 1 the period 2 discount factor. The formal optimization program
9That is, the conditional distribution p(r|c1) = p(c1,r)∫
p(c1,r)dr
.
10In information theory, κ is defined as the Shannon’s channel capacity and the reduction of uncertainty
about the interest rate obtained by processing a signal corresponds to the change in the entropy of its
distribution. See Appendix A for a more detailed explanation of Shannon’s theory and its relation to
entropy reduction.
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reads:
max
p(r,c1)
E
{∫
[u(c1) + βu(c2)]p(ct, wt)µ(dc1, dr)|I1
}
(1)
s.t. κ = I(p(c1, r)) (2)
c2 = r(1− c1) (3)
for a given prior g(r) and with p(c1, r) ∈ D(w, c), where D(r, c) denotes the set of proper
distributions. In equation (1), E is the conditional expectation defined with respect to
the σ-algebra generated by I1, while µ(·) accounts for potential discreteness in the optimal
choice of p(c, r). The interpretation of the information processing constraint in equation
(2), which equates mutual information and κ, is that, for a given shadow cost of processing
information,11 the agent chooses the amount of information she wants to process. This
specification of information processing constraint is known as elastic capacity: fixing the
marginal (shadow) cost, the quantity of information κ acquired varies according to the needs
of the agent.
This is a well-posed convex problem, with infinite-dimensional state and control variables.
However, given potential discreteness in the optimal distribution, without restrictive assumptions
on the shape of the utility and prior distribution, it rarely admits a fully analytical characterization.
In general, the solution of the program (1)-(3) is the equilibrium distribution p∗(c1, r) which,
from Bayes’ rule, can be represented as:
p∗(c1, r) = p∗(c1|r)g(r),
where the marginal interest rate distribution is equal to the prior,
∫
p∗(c1, r)dc1 = g(r), to
satisfy model’s internal consistency. The conditional distribution p∗(c1|r) embeds the effects
of more accurate information about interest rate provided by the selected signal to sharpen
consumption choices.
2.2 A Useful Closed-Form Solution
To build intuition on the character of the solution and derive testable predictions from the
model, we specialize the theoretical framework by assuming a uniform distribution for g(r)
and a quadratic utility function, which are directly conducive to the experimental setting.
The prior on the interest rate is uniformly distributed over the interval R = [r, r¯], where
11That is, for a given Lagrange multiplier associated with constraint (2).
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r < β−1 < r¯. Moreover, to facilitate the implementation of the experimental design, we
assume the signals on interest rates available to the agent partition the interest rate space
into sub-intervals of equivalent length, proportional to the precision of the signal. The
distribution implied by the signals is also piece-wise uniform within each partition. Let Ri
indicate a generic partition of R determined by the signal of precision i, such that Ri = [ri, r¯i].
Then, the solution of the problem in terms of consumption can be compactly written as:
β−1u′(c1) = ERi {ru′(r(1− c1))} (4)
where u′(·) is the derivative of utility with respect to consumption, and the expectation
ERi is taken with respect to the information provided by the optimal signal p∗(r|c1) for the
interval Ri.
To further characterize the solution, let us assume that the utility u(c) takes on the form:
u(c) =
 α(c− c¯)
2
0
c < c¯
c ≥ c¯ , c¯ r¯
which postulates that the satiation point c¯ is much higher than the maximum amount that
could be consumed by saving all the endowment in the first period, even in the case of the
highest possible realization of interest rate, r = r¯.
The joint assumption of quadratic utility and uniform prior allows us to invoke the
certainty equivalent principle and divide the decision problem into information choice and
consumption selection given the information acquired. Defining the expectation operator
ERi and of the corresponding variance VRi , the RI consumption choice for this case is:
c1 =
c¯+ β (ERi(r2)− ERi(r)c¯)
1 + βERi(r2)
=
c¯+ β
(
E2Ri(r) + VRi(r)− ERi(r)c¯
)
1 + β
(
E2Ri(r) + VRi(r)
) (5)
The benchmark against which we compare the RI model’s solution in (5) is the full
information (FI) model. The FI problem is simply to maximize the above quadratic utility
subject to (3) and its solution is:
c1 =
(c¯+ β (r2 − rc¯))
1 + βr2 . (6)
We see that, in (5), the certain value of the perfectly observed interest rate r is replaced by
its expected value within the interval Ri, revealed by the signal chosen by the agent.
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2.3 Testable Predictions
We use equation (5) to further characterize four predictions of the model that can be
tested in our laboratory experiment. A caveat worth mentioning is that the validity of the
closed-form solution in eq. (5) relies on the assumption of quadratic functional form of the
utility, and that this specification implies a relatively flat slope of the utility. Moreover,
this functional form implies that agent typically devote little attention to monetary policy
news in making consumption choices. Such an assumption is corroborated by the empirical
evidence on households and firms (see, among the others, Coibion et al., 2019; Kumar et al.,
2015; Roth and Wohlfart, 2019; Easaw et al., 2013).
In invoking this assumption to obtain a closed-form solution, we favor sharper and more
direct implications of the theory on consumption behavior over a more prominent role of the
information processing choices.
2.3.1 Testable Prediction 1
Consumption in period 1 decreases as the expected interest rate increases. However, as
implied by equation (5), the utility benefit of processing more information about the interest
rate is bounded. The first part of the prediction follows immediately from ∂c1
∂ERi (r)
< 0, while
the second part of the prediction clearly stems from the assumed utility functional form.
2.3.2 Testable Prediction 2
Consumption in period 1 increases as the perceived volatility of the interest rate increases.
This prediction stems from ∂c1
∂VRi (r)
> 0. In our model, where the interest rate is perceived
as a random variable by agents, consumption in period 1 can be interpreted as the “safe”
asset. Viceversa, a decrease in volatility of the stochastic interest rate would make returns
to saving more predictable and, hence, safer. Moreover, a reduction in interest rate volatility
reduces the information required to precisely track the interest rate. As a result, the RI
consumption outcomes would be closer to the FI information outcome in this case.
2.3.3 Testable Prediction 3
A decrease in the discount rate β, lowers consumption c1 and makes information processing
less valuable. This prediction stems from ∂c1
∂β
< 0. A decrease in the discount rate can
be interpreted as a deterioration of the outlook from the agents’ perspective. With less
confidence in future earnings, agents retreat to the safety of c1. The decision of consuming
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more today also implies that there is even less incentive to process information about
tomorrow’s return on savings, i.e. about the interest rate.
2.3.4 Testable Prediction 4
Enhanced predictability of the interest rate path does not affect consumption behavior.
This theoretical result stems from the fact that rationally inattentive agents optimally choose
their signal on the interest rate taking into account their information-processing capacity as
well as their utility. As a result, a public signal that contains less information than what is
optimally chosen would be mostly disregarded as agents rely on their own richer information
set to learn about the interest rate. Likewise, a public signal that contains more information
than what they would have optimally chosen would be processed with noise: had the agents
had sufficient information processing capacity or more interest in processing information as
commanded by their utility, they would have already optimally chosen a more informative
signal about the interest rate. Thus, a commitment from the monetary authority to provide
an accurate path of the monetary policy stance would have limited material impact on
consumption.
3 Experimental Design and Implementation
This section lays out details of our within-subject experimental design, including a
description of the tasks designed to implement the model in Section 2 as well as the four
treatments.
3.1 Experimental Task
The basic idea of the experiment is to create a decision problem in which one decides how
much to consume and how much to save when the interest rate is uncertain. To simplify the
task, subjects select one among 11 lotteries with well-specified payoffs for each of 32 equally
likely possible states of the world. The 11 lotteries correspond to different levels of period 1
consumption and the 32 states of the world correspond to possible interest rate realizations.
Because period 1 consumption and the interest rate determine period 2 consumption per
equation (3), these two values are enough to fully determine the discounted expected utility,
which gives the payoff of a given lottery in a given state (see equation 1). In the experiment,
the payoffs are described to subjects as prizes, the lottery choice is described as selecting
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one of 11 prize cards, and the realized state is described as drawing a numbered ball (from
1-32) from a computerized bingo cage.
The prize number (interest rate) is actually drawn before a subject makes her prize card
(consumption/savings) choice, but this realization is not revealed to the subject. Consistent
with the model’s assumption, the subjects have an uninformative (uniform) prior over all
the possible realizations of the interest rate, denoted by g(r) in Section 2. Before making
consumption/savings decisions, subjects can reduce uncertainty about the interest rate by
acquiring a signal through solving cognitively challenging puzzles. Signals identify narrower
ranges over which the realized state of the world is uniformly distributed. We provide subjects
with an array of signals widths; longer intervals are associated with easier puzzles, while more
precise signals require solving more difficult puzzles. More details about signals, intervals,
and cognitive puzzles are discussed below in Section 3.2. With the introduction of these
signals, the subject’s problem becomes how much information to acquire before selecting a
prize card. The interval of possible prizes revealed to the subject after acquiring a signal
defines the corresponding optimal conditional distribution in the theoretical framework,
p∗(c1|r).
The experiment is deployed in the laboratory using the interface shown in Figure 1. The
possible prizes – the cells in the table – follow the quadratic surface of the lifetime utility in
Section 2. The possible prize numbers are represented by the columns of the table and the
rows of the table denote the prize cards. The payoffs in red font provide the full information
benchmark of the optimal c1 associated with each possible interest rate.
Signal selection in the experiment is done by clicking on one of the boxes in the lower left
corner of the figure. If a subject successfully obtains a signal then some prize numbers are
grayed out for every row, thus reducing the number of possible outcomes and hence payoffs.
A signal with level 1 precision reduces the number of possible states of the world by half,
and either side of the payoff table could be revealed as containing the true realization of
r. In the figure, this case is illustrated by going from the full space enclosed by the yellow,
solid-line box to the reduced space enclosed by the green dashed-line box on the right side
of the table corresponding to p∗(c1|r).
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Figure 1: Mapping the theory to the experiment: A screenshot of the experimental interface with elements of the theoretical
framework superimposed. The matrix of lottery payoffs in the yellow box are a function of the r drawn in the column (32
possibilities) and the consumption choice of the subject in the row (11 options). Red payoffs indicate the full information
optimum for a given r. Subjects select a signal by clicking on one of the cyan buttons on the SW corner of the interface,
which reveals a subset of columns containing the true realization of r (the green dashed box, which corresponds to the
theoretical conditional distribution of consumption p∗(c1|r) ). In the example, the second signal precision is selected and
the right side of the r support is revealed. Signal selection and restricted support jointly correspond to the choice of the
optimal distribution p∗(c1, r).
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Once a signal is revealed, the subjects chooses a row which would then be highlighted
in green. This is equivalent to drawing a particular realization of c1 from the optimal
distribution conditional on the signal, p∗(c1|r). Next the column of the prize number is
revealed and highlighted in blue.12 The intersection of the row and column determines the
payoff for subject and this amount is added to the subject’s cumulative payoff. Again looking
at Figure 1, if row 8 is chosen and column 29 is drawn, the subject would earn a payoff of
73.6.
3.2 Signal Characteristics and Cognitive Tasks
In the model, we postulate that the representative agent is limited in her ability to process
information about interest rate variations. In the experiment, we encode this limit through
the structure of the precision level of the signals. This section describes the characteristics
and information content of these signals.
Subjects have six levels of signal precision available, ranging from uninformative (level
0) to fully informative (level 5). We measure the informativeness of the signal as amount
of information (in bits) contained in the signal. Letting j ∈ (0, 5) indicate the precision
level, a signal identifies one of the 2j intervals containing 25−j draws into which the full
support of draws is partitioned. Since the signals presented to the subjects all have uniform
distribution, our signals have the property that the change in entropy is constant from one
precision level to the next, and equal to 0.3 bits. This structure means that, once a signal is
revealed, the expectation ERi and the corresponding variance VRi in the optimal choice of
which lottery to play described in equation (5) in Section 2.2 are taken with respect to the
updated prior on the states of the world as it emerges from the signal.
The actual logic puzzles are based on a visual task developed by Civelli and Deck (2018).
These puzzles take on the form of a (3 × 3) graphical matrix in which eight images are
provided and one is omitted. Subjects must identify the missing image among a set of
alternatives, after analyzing how the images are similar or different along each of several
dimensions. A puzzle’s level of difficulty is based on the number of dimensions along which
images vary.13 An example puzzle is illustrated in Appendix C.
Given the puzzle calibration exercises conducted by Civelli and Deck (2018), we are able
to create tasks of a desired cognitive difficulty by requiring someone to solve a series of
12In the experiment, the subject must confirm the row choice before the outcome is revealed.
13The puzzles are similar to the well-known Raven’s Progressive Matrices. We opt to use these puzzles
rather than Raven’s Progressive Matrices because the level of difficulty can be controlled and there are
potentially a very large number of puzzles of any given difficulty level.
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Precision Level Logic Puzzle Attributes % Task Correct
0 1 puzzle: level 0 99%
1 2 puzzles: level 1 and level 1 80%
2 2 puzzles: level 1 and level 2 65%
3 2 puzzles: level 2 and level 2 50%
4 2 puzzles: level 3 and level 3 35%
5 2 puzzles: level 4 and level 5 20%
Table 1: Signal structure: precision level, logic puzzle attributes, and expected success rate
of cognitive tasks. Note: a level k puzzle has k attribute changes.
puzzles. Acquiring a signal requires correctly solving two puzzles, with the exception of
precision level 0 which requires solving one trivial puzzle.14 Table 1 shows the precision
level of the signal (first column), number of attributes changed in each puzzle that forms the
task (second column), and the calibrated probability that a subject successfully acquires a
signal (third column). In the experiment, a subject could try as many times as she wishes
to acquire a signal. A subject could attempt to acquire a more precise signal after obtaining
a less precise signal, but could not attempt to acquire a less precise signal after acquiring a
more precise signal.15
3.3 Experimental Implementation
The experiment uses a within-subject design and is broken into several parts. First the
subjects read general instructions about how to interpret the prize table and go through
10 unpaid practice periods where they select a price card and observe the outcome for a
randomly drawn prize number.16 Second, subjects read additional instructions on signal
acquisition and logic puzzles before completing a 10 minutes unpaid practice phase. Next,
subjects re-read the main instructions and then began the paid portion of the experiment.17
14Subjects do not have to solve the puzzle correctly to receive a precision level 0 signal since it is completely
uninformative. Subjects do have to go through the motions of acquiring a level 0 signal to maintain
consistency.
15This assumption encoded in the experimental setting captures the well-known principle in information
theory that information cannot be forgotten. In order to avoid subjects having to rely on cognitive effort
to remember the more informative signals, we prevent them from choosing signals with lower precision than
one already successfully obtained.
16In the experiment, the term period refers to the process of acquiring a signal, selecting a prize card, and
receiving a payoff. This should not be confused with the notion of period 1 and period 2 consumption as
described in the model as these notions were never introduced to subjects.
17The instructions before and after the practice phase differed slightly due to the subject being at different
points in the study, but the two sets of instructions did not differ materially.
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Subject instructions are available in Appendix C.
The paid portion of the experiment consisted of four phases. Each paid phase was
associated with one of the four treatments described in the next subsection. The order of
the treatments was randomized for each subject to control for learning and sequence effects.
Subjects knew that there were four paid phases, but did not know anything about a given
phase until reaching that point in the study. Each phase was preceded by brief phase-
specific instructions. Each of the four practice phases lasted approximately 10 minutes. In
each phase, subjects face an indefinite number of periods during which they can try to earn
as much money as possible. The unspecified ending time is designed to mitigate end of
game effects on behavior. A cap on the number of periods that could be completed during
a phase was intended to discourage subjects from opting to always solve easy puzzles and
race through the task.18 Once a subject confirmed their prize card choice and received the
payoff for that period, the subject automatically proceeded to the next period.
The experiment was conducted at The Interactive Decision Experiment (TIDE) Lab at
The University of Alabama. Subjects were recruited from the lab’s standing subject pool.19
A total of 51 subjects participated in the experiment over the course of 3 sessions during
October 2019. Average subject payment, including a $5 participation payment, was $24.16
USD. The salient portion of a subject’s earnings was the sum of her cumulative earnings in the
four paid phases. All prize payoffs displayed to the subjects were in cents and final payments
were rounded up to the next quarter. Each session lasted approximately 90 minutes, which
included working through the instructions, the practice phases, and participating in the
actual experiment.
3.4 Experimental Treatments
Up to this point the description of the task has focused on the baseline (Treatment 1).
In Treatment 2, which we dub the Delphic forward guidance treatment, the interest rate
is drawn randomly from a uniform distribution whose support, [0.7 1.0], is lower than the
18For this reason, there was also a one-minute time penalty for subjects who made decisions without
obtaining a signal precision above 0. This feature of the experimental design exemplifies the case in which
a representative agent incurs in a fee for investing her savings in an asset without any information about
the potential returns or losses of the investment. This cost is codified in the assumed functional form of
the utility for which a zero consumption returns the maximum loss of c¯2. In the experiment, few subjects
reached the cap of 10 periods, but several opted to incur the time penalty from making a decision with a
completely uninformed prior.
19The subject pool primarily consists of undergraduate students from across campus, but graduate students
comprise a small percentage of the subject pool.
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(1) Range of r ∈
[r1, ..., r32]
(2) Discount
factor β
(3) Utility function
parameters [c¯;α]
(4) Subjects’ information
set before treatment
Treatment 1 (T1)
Baseline [0.4 1.3] 0.90 [1.5; 10] General Instructions
Treatment 2 (T2)
Delphic Forward Guidance [0.7 1.0] 0.90 [1.5; 10] General Instructions
Treatment 3 (T3)
Outlook Deterioration [0.4 1.3] 0.75 [1.5; 10] General Instructions
Treatment 4 (T4)
Odyssean Forward Guidance [0.4 1.3] 0.90 [1.5; 10]
r in top/bottom half of range,
correct with prob. .9
Table 2: Parametric characterization of each treatment. Column (3) specifies the parameter
used in the utility function described in Section 2.2, where c¯ is the satiation level and α the
multiplicative constant. Column (4) states which information participants are given at the
beginning of each treatment. Payoffs are displayed in Figure 1.
support, [0.4 1.3], of the baseline. The shrinkage of the support in a uniform distribution
implies that the volatility associated to the interest rate is reduced. As a result, the degree
of uncertainty about the economic environment and the level of risk in investing (savings)
are both diminished. This treatment combines the testable predictions of Subsections 2.3.1
and 2.3.2.
In Treatment 3, dubbed the outlook deterioration treatment, we decrease the appeal of
savings by decreasing the discount factor β in (1) from β = .9 in Treatment 1 to β = .75. This
corresponds to a situation where the agent becomes less optimistic about future investment
prospects. This treatment encompasses the testable prediction in Subsection 2.3.3.
Finally, in Treatment 4, the Odyssean forward guidance treatment, we retain the same
values of the lottery and range of interest rates as in the Treatment 1 but the realized draw
becomes more predictable. Specifically, subjects are provided with a noisy clue as to whether
the realized outcome is in the first half of the possible outcomes or the second half. This
signal is correct with a 90% probability, which is known to the subject. We use this treatment
to test the prediction in Subsection 2.3.4.
Table 2 summarizes the specific calibration for each treatment. The first column shows
the range of the interest rate, while the second column the discount factor. In column
3, we encode the parametrization of the utility function as described in Section 2.2, with c¯
indicating the satiation level and α the multiplicative constant. Column 4 describes the clues
the participants are given on the treatments they are about to play in the experiment, which
characterizes their information set before making their signal and consumption choices.
17
4 Results
In this section we compare theoretical predictions to empirical observations. We start by
illustrating the implications of the model assumptions laid out in Section 2 on the empirical
setting and outcomes. We formally test how consumption choices of the representative
rational inattentive (RI) agent compare with the choices selected by subjects, and whether
the behavior predicted by the RI model describes the empirical behavior better than the
model with full information (FI).
We proceed by formally testing the main theoretical predictions of the model in Section 2
against the empirical choices of participants in the laboratory experiment. First, we explore
the value of information processing in observed consumption choices, and contrast empirical
consumption outcomes with the theoretical optimum expressed in equation (5) of Section 2.
This allows us to gauge the consistency between the empirical distribution of consumption
and the theoretical predictions in Subsection 2.3.1. Second, we test the effectiveness on both
theoretical and empirical consumption outcomes of two kinds of forward guidance in the
lab: Delphic and Odyssean forward guidance corresponding to the testable predictions in
Subsection 2.3.2 and 2.3.4, respectively. Finally, we test whether consumption choices with
a deterioration of the outlook as defined in Subsection 2.3.3 are aligned with their empircal
counterparts.
4.1 Theoretical Assumptions and Empirical Outcomes
The closed-form theoretical solution of the model in equation (5) relies on the assumption
of quadratic utility of the agents. Translating this assumption into the empirical model
results in a rather flat profile of expected gains, as evident from the payoff matrix in Figure
1. Moreover, in the model with fixed lifetime endowment, consumption in period 1 is akin to
investing in an asset with certain return as opposite to the uncertain-return asset represented
by savings and consuming in period 2, implied by the stochasticity of the interest rate. In this
environment, the theory predicts that when the utility gains of processing more information
do not provide a sufficient compensation for the cognitive effort of precisely tracking the
interest rate, the agent would prefer to experiment with changes in the behavioral variable
rather than varying signal acquisition.
Figures 2 and 3 suggest this is the case in the experiment as well. The figures plot
individual (blue) and average (red) choices in the experiment across treatments for period
1 consumption (Figure 2) and precision (Figure 3). The laboratory evidence reveals that
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subjects prefer to exercise a relatively modest cognitive effort in processing information,
represented by low and flat signal precision, while they are more willing to adjust the
behavioral variable in response to different interest rate scenarios.
In general, the period 1 consumption behavior predicted by the model captures rather
closely the average subject choices across treatments, as the black (representative agent) and
red (experimental average) lines in Figure 2 show. This result has a stark monetary policy
implication: when changes in interest rates policy are unimportant for people’s utility, these
changes are unlikely to elicit strong behavioral reactions in attention allocation.
4.2 Value of Information, Model Validation, and Consumption
Outcomes
We first establish how information about interest rate movements impact agents’ total
profits (lifetime utility) by comparing the laboratory outcomes with the full information
benchmark for the baseline (Treatment 1: T1). Figure 4 illustrates the loss in lifetime utility
calculated as the difference between full information profits and realized total profits as
a percentage of full information profits (y-axis), plotted against the precision level of the
signals acquired (x-axis). Each dot in the figure represents the average precision acquired
by one subject and her average percentage profit loss in T1. From our experimental design,
the participants can choose among six progressively higher precision levels, with 0 being the
uninformative signal and 5 corresponding to the full information. It is immediate to see
lower signal precision are associated with higher utility losses. We formalize this graphical
intuition by estimating a kernel regression between the average loss and the average signal
precision. The choice of a kernel regression is motivated by the possibility of a non-linear
relationship between the two variables.20
Figure 4 also shows that there are diminishing returns to information processing for the
quadratic utility specification assumed in Section 2.2. In fact, the flatness of the quadratic
utility at high values of consumption provides minimal gains to information processing
beyond signal precision 3, whereas for signals with precision less than or equal to 2 the
lifetime utility gains from increasing information processing are more substantial. Departures
from the full-information benchmark also depends on the heterogeneity in risk attitude of
the subjects. As an example, consider the dots of Figure 4 corresponding to precision 1.
Subjects that gather little information differ widely with respect to payoff losses according
20We use a local linear kernel with Nadaraya-Watson estimator and apply a bandwith of 0.58, estimated
following Bowman and Azzalini (1997).
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Figure 2: Consumption choices for the first period of the model (c1) across treatments for the
subjects in the experiment. Individual average c1 choices are given by the thin, dashed blue lines,
overall subjects average by the thick red line, and the representative agent choice by the thick black
line. Treatments defined in Table 2
Figure 3: Highest signal precision level chosen by the subjects in the experiment before making
their consumption choice across treatments. Individual average precision is given by the thin,
dashed blue lines, while the overall subjects average by the thick red line. Treatments defined in
Table 2
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Figure 4: Average difference between full information and realized total payoffs (lifetime
utility) as percentage of full information total payoffs plotted against average signal precision.
The averages are taken within subjects. Each dot represents the average outcomes of one
subject in the course of the baseline treatment. The red line corresponds to the local linear
kernel regression with Nadaraya-Watson estimator.
to whether they are over- or under-confident. In the first case, they make riskier bets on the
interest rate and trade off consumption today for a better payoff tomorrow while retreat to
the safe asset (c1) in lieu of exercising more effort to track the interest rate.
Next, we evaluate the congruence of the subjects’ behavior with that of the representative
agent from the RI model. Furthermore, we assess whether the consumption behavior predicted
in the RI model describes the experimental consumption choices better than the FI model.
Figure 5 presents a scatter plot of the consumption choices c1 of the RI representative
agent (y-axis) against the experimental choices of the subjects (x-axis). For both theoretical
and experimental data the c1 outcomes are de-meaned, and each dot represents an observation
of the triplet [Theoretical RI c1, Experimental c1, Signal Precision].21 The color of the dot
indicates the precision chosen by each subject according to the scale on the upper right
21For the baseline treatment, T1, the mean for the theoretical RI c1 is 0.65 whereas the experimental
average is 0.63
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Figure 5: Scatter plot of theoretical and experimental consumption choices, c1. Observations
are de-meaned and each dot represents a subject. The color of the dots indicates the precision
selected by the subject according to the legend in the upper-east corner of the figure. The
size of the dot is proportional to the sample frequency of a given triplet (precision, theoretical
c1, experimental c1).
corner of the figure. The size of the dot is proportional to the sample frequency of each
triplet. There are two main take-aways from this figure.
First, for higher precision levels (i.e., level 4) the experimental choices of c1 are very close
to both the FI model and the RI representative agent choices. This observational equivalence
between the FI model, the RI model, and observed behavior arises in our setting because
of the length of the interval revealed by the signal for high precision compounded with the
flatness of the utility function assumed in the theoretical model. Thus, the more informative
cases in terms of congruence of model predictions and experimental choices occur at lower
precision levels, where the width of the interval is substantial and the sample much more
sizeable.
Second, with respect to informative precision levels ranging from 1 to 3, Figure 5 shows
a remarkable consistency of the experimental outcomes with the behavior predicted by the
RI model for the cases with higher sample frequency (i.e., bigger dots). This finding places
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the average consumption choice per subject strikingly close to the RI representative agent
outcome in each precision level.
We corroborate this visual insight by formally testing the fit of the RI model in describing
the experimental data and its performance in comparison to the FI outcomes. To this end, we
run linear regressions of individual subjects’ experimental c1 choices on the RI representative
agent behavior predicted by the model. We first run these regressions individually for the
three informative precision levels, precision 1 to 3, observed in the baseline treatment of the
experiment, T1.22 We then estimate two pooled models, again for the T1 observations: one
including fixed effects and one without fixed effects but using weights proportional to the
length of the signal intervals.23,24 We run this battery of regressions of the experimental c1’s
on the full information solution as well, and we formally contrast the regressions outcomes
from the RI and the FI models to assess their relative performance in explaining the experimental
data. The results of this analysis are in Table 3.
The first three models of Table 3 present the estimates of an OLS regression of the
experimental consumption, c1, on either the rational inattention prediction of consumption,
cRI in the table, or the full information outcome of consumption, cFI , conditional on the
precision levels of the signal. In all the regressions we use robust standard errors clustered
by subjects. We take the evidence from these three models as the baseline in our analysis.
If a theoretical model is a good fit for the data, we would expect the slope associated to
the consumption choice predicted by the model to be close to one and the constant of the
regression to be close to zero. As the table illustrates, the coefficients associated to cRI are
systematically bigger and closer to 1 than those associated to cFI . A t-test of the slope of
the regression cannot reject the hypothesis that the slope of the regression for the model is,
in fact, one for precision 1 but not for the other two. Similarly the constant terms are also
smaller in the RI case, and not significantlly different from zero for precision 1.
22We omit precision level 0, the uninformative signal, since the theoretical prediction for this particular
signal corresponding to a zero-capacity Shannon’s channel is just a random draw from the uniform
distribution of the interest rate.
23The F.E. model excludes precision 4, since only one subject chooses this signal in the experiment and
only 4 observations are available at this precision.
24The F.E. model controls for the systematic bias in the distribution of consumption at different precision
levels. For instance, both RI models and the data display leptokurtic and left-skewed distributions as opposite
to the uniform updated prior revealed by the signals. The weighted model is meant to capture the fact that
subjects face more freedom in the choice of c1 for lower precision signals. The probability of a choice being
close to the RI model simply because of chance is therefore smaller the larger the interval.
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Table 3: Model validation – Estimation of the regression of Experimental consuption choices, c1, on the consumption
predicted by the Rational Inattention model, cRI , and by the Full Information model, cFI . OLS estimation, with standard
errors clustered by subject reported in parentheses. Significance of estimated coefficients at 1%, 5%, and 10% level is
respectively indicated by ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗. Models (1)-(3) are estimated by precision level of the selected signal as indicated
in the Table. Model (4) uses precision fixed effects, with precision 0 as baseline and excluding precision 4. Model (5) is a
weighted pooled model, with weights proportional to the length of the signal intervals. (a) T-Test of the null hypothesis
that coefficient on either cRI or cFI is equal to one (p-values reported); (b) BIC statistic computed using N. Obs.; (c) Non-
nested model coparison tests (p-values reported). J-Test correspond to the Davidson-McKinnon test. The alternative
hypothesis MFI MRI always rejected (omitted).
(1) Precision 1 (2) Precision 2 (3) Precision 3 (4) F.E. (5) Weighted
RI FI RI FI RI FI RI FI RI FI
cRI 0.91 0.88 0.84 0.88 0.89
(0.08)*** (0.03)*** (0.01)*** (0.04)*** (0.05)***
cFI 0.59 0.79 0.78 0.66 0.57
(0.06)*** (0.03)*** (0.02)*** (0.04)*** (0.06)***
Const. 0.04 0.24 0.06 0.12 0.09 0.13 0.06 0.18 0.05 0.26
(0.04) (0.03)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.05) (0.05)*** (0.03) (0.03)***
prec1 -0.01 0.02
(0.04) (0.05)
prec2 0.00 0.03
(0.04) (0.05)
prec3 0.00 0.03
(0.04) (0.05)
N. Obs. 229 229 122 122 72 72 449 449 453 453
Slope = 1(a) .24 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .06 .00
BIC(b) -570.4 -432.8 -489.1 -374.3 -414.6 -346.9 -1232.8 -956.2 -1080 -838
MRI MFI :(c)
J-Test .34 .03 .99 .24 .54
Cox-Pesaran .17 .03 .49 .08 .00
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These results are confirmed by the other two models in Table 3. Model (4) presents the
results of the linear regression for unconditional c1, estimated with precision fixed effects
to account for systematic biases within precision. Model (5) presents the results for the
unconditional c1, where the observations are weighted proportionally to the length of the
precision interval. This weighting scheme accounts for the fact that a larger interval revealed
by the signal is relatively more informative of the goodness of fit of the RI model than a
smaller one. The slope of the regression is not significantly different than one only for the RI
case in Model (5), however the constant is not significantly different than zero for both the
RI regressions, but substantially larger and significant for the two FI models. Interestingly,
the fixed-effect models show there is little, if no, heterogeneity in the pooled regression across
precision levels.
The last rows of the table formally test whether the rational inattention model does
a better job in predicting the experimental data than the full information model, thereby
testing the assumption of capacity constrained individuals. The BIC statistics show that
in the pairwaise comparison within each regression group, the RI model exhibits a better
fit than the FI model and it would always be strongly selected by the criterion.25 The
Davidson-McKinnon (J-test) and Cox-Pesaran tests for non-nested model comparison favor
the rational inattention model over the full information model across the board as well. At
the same time, the alternative hypothesis that the the FI model is preferable is strongly
rejected in each case (not reported in the Table). Thus, we can reject the hypothesis that
individuals behave according to the full information model and we find robust evidence that
our subjects display a degree of rational inattention in their consumption choices.
4.3 Forward Guidance Outcomes
We explore the effects on consumption and information processing of two dimensions of
forward guidance. First, we study whether a monetary authority that commits to lower
volatility of the policy instruments succeeds in affecting consumption behavior of the agents
as well as in modifying their attention to monetary policy. This treatment can be considered
as a form of Delphic Forward Guidance.26 We test the theoretical prediction in Subsections
2.3.1 and 2.3.2 in the laboratory experiment by giving to the subject a significantly lower
range of possible realizations of the interest rate, thereby reducing the variance of the
25The AIC results are similar, thus we omit them from Table 3 for sake of brevity.
26Campbell et al. (2012) defines Delphic forward guidance as using interest rate to stabilize the economic
outlook, while Odyssean forward guidance is a commitment to undertake policy actions in the future, like
“keeping rates lower for longer” when inflation and GDP rise.
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(uniform) interest rate distribution. The results of this stimulus are in Subsection 4.3.1.
Second, we study whether an enhanced predictability of the interest rate policy may
provide enough stimulus to the subject to change their behavior toward consumption and
information processing. This treatment can be considered as a form of Odyssean Forward
Guidance.27 We test this assumption by having the monetary authority announcing whether
the monetary policy stance would be accomodative (low interest rate) or tight (high interest
rate) during the current period and committing to the announcement 90% of the time while
deviating from that commitment with probability 10%. The results of this treatment are in
Subsection 4.3.2.
4.3.1 Delphic forward guidance
A monetary policy that makes the interest rate path less volatile and, as a result, more
stable by, e.g., providing forward guidance via Fed officials’ communication and regular
release of the Summary of Economic Projection (SEP) forecasts, requires less effort from
the representative agents to track the policy instrument closely. This occurs because the
predictability of the interest rate path implies a lower cognitive burden to the tracking of
the interest rates for the agents. As a result, agents are more confident in their estimate of
the monetary policy stance when making consumption and investment decisions.
The RI model’s prediction in Subsection 2.3.2 calls for a c1 choice which is closer to the
FI benchmark when the volatility of the interest rate is reduced. This prediction stems from
the fact that a lower volatility reduces the effort necessary to precisely track the policy rate,
so that the RI agent’s consumption choices are, on average, more deliberate and, as a result,
her welfare computed as lifetime utility is closer to that of the FI agent. Combining the
theoretical predictions of Subsections 2.3.2 and 2.3.1, the model predicts a decreasing and
flatter c1 profile as a function of the interest rate expected by the RI agent. An illustration
of this prediction is provided in Appendix B, while we focus on the welfare implications here.
We implement this scenario with a reduction of the interest rate volatility to about
one tenth of the baseline one, as explained in Section 3.4. This treatment captures the
monetary policy’s aim to stimulate private sector’s investment by providing a stable economic
environment for households and lower their cognitive effort of tracking the interest rate.28
27We see this treatment as a form of Odyssean forward guidance in that, at least in principle, providing a
signal on the monetary policy stance and committing to a high accuracy of the signal is a guidance to the
private sector on the behavior of the interest rate that may foster a more predictable environment in which
to consume and allocate attention.
28Under our distributional assumption on the interest rate, a reduction in its variance implies that fewer
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We evaluate the effectiveness of this policy by comparing deviations, in terms of losses, of
lifetime utility from the full information benchmark as a percentage of full information values
in this scenario relative to the baseline. As standard for evaluating monetary policy changes
in the literature, we use lifetime utility as a proxy for agents’ welfare, measured by the mean
total profits of each subject in the experiment. Figure 6 illustrates the kernel estimates of the
aggregate distributions of the welfare losses for the rational inattention theory (top panel)
and the experimental data (bottom panel). In both panels, blue dashed lines indicate the
baseline (T1) whereas the red solid lines represent the Delphic forward guidance treatment
(T2). The densities are estimated using a Gaussian kernel.
Four main observations emerge from this figure. First, the experimental data is strongly
consistent with the RI theoretical predictions. The main difference between experimental
and theoretical cases is a longer tale for the experimental distributions. Second, welfare
losses are largely smaller under T2 than they are under T1. The T2 density is much more
concentrated than the T1 one: the empirical density displays a clear, sizeable peak around
0.15%, while the distribution of losses in T1 is spread out over the support 0-10% with a
peak around 1.25%. More importantly, the standard deviation of the distribution of losses
is dramatically reduced from 2.6% in T1 to 0.7% in T2. The T2 distribution is leptokurtic
and left-skewed.
Third, the difference between RI theoretical outcomes and experimental data can likely
be attributed to risk aversion. The representative RI agent displays modest risk tolerance
consistent with the quadratic utility, whereas experimental subjects appear more risk averse.
However, note that the average subject in the experiment modestly lowers her attention to
the interest rate (decrease signal precision, as evident from Figure 3) and moderately increase
investment (lowers c1 consumption with respect to T1 as shown by Figure 2). With respect
to c1 and investment decisions, the representative RI agent and the average experimental
subjects appear alligned as per Figure 2.
Finally, in the RI theory as well as in the experimental data, the decrease in both the
magnitude and the volatility of welfare losses are consistent with behavioral choices that
are more deliberate and attune to an economic environment with reduced uncertainty with
respect to the baseline. The monetary policy implication of the comparison between T2 and
the baseline is that the form of Delphic forward guidance considered appears to be effective
in reducing the welfare loss in a world where agents are rationally inattentive.
bits of information are needed to accurately track the interest rate with respect to the baseline.
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Figure 6: Aggregate density distribution of welfare losses as percentage of full information
under the Delphic forward guidance treatment (T2) in red solid line and the baseline (T1)
in blue dashed line. The aggregate densities are estimated using a Gaussian kernel. The top
panel shows the density for the representative RI agent, whereas the bottom panel displays
the density for the average aggregate experimental data. For the data, welfare losses are
computed as mean deviations per subject of total profits from full information profits.
4.3.2 Odyssean forward guidance
An announcement of future paths of interest rate constitutes an attempt from the monetary
authority to keep monetary policy predictable and, as a result, ehancing the predictability
of the economic environment. Examples of this form of forward guidance in the U.S. are in
several FOMC’s statements and speeches signalling whether the monetary policy stance is
loose or tight. The literature has labelled this kind of forward guidance as Odyssean.
For this scenario, we assume that the central bank announces to the public whether
the monetary policy stance in the current period would be accomodative (low interest rate)
or tight (high interest rate). The monetary authority commits to deliver a signal on the
monetary policy stance that is 90% accurate. For this case, the model predicts no change
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Figure 7: Aggregate density distribution of welfare losses as percentage of full information
under the Odyssean forward guidance treatment (T4) in red-dashed line and the baseline
(T1) in blue solid line. The aggregate densities are estimated using a Gaussian kernel.
The top panel shows the density for the representative RI agent, whereas the bottom panel
displays the density for the average aggregate experimental data. For the data, welfare losses
are computed as average mean deviations per subject of total profits from full information
profits.
in consumption behavior with respect to the baseline. The rationale behind this theoretical
finding stems from the fact that, conditional on the signal acquired, the optimal choice
in equation (5) remains unchanged under this scenario with respect to the baseline. An
illustration of this prediction is in Appendix B.
We implement this scenario by giving the subjects the announcement on the monetary
policy stance at the beginning of each period of this treatment, as explained in Section
3.4. This treatment is meant to replicate the commitment of the monetary authority to
make the interest rate more predictable. This policy’s goal is that interest rate rigidity
may foster investment while lowering the cognitive burden of keeping track of the policy
rate. As we did for the previous form of forward guidance, we assess the effectiveness of
29
this policy experiment on private sector’s welfare by studying the percentage deviations of
lifetime utility from the full information benchmark in this treatment in comparison to the
baseline.
The estimated aggregate kernel densities of these deviations are reported in Figure 7 for
the rational inattention theory (top panel) and the experimental data (bottom panel). As
above, blue dashed lines indicate the baseline (T1), whereas the red solid lines represent the
Odyssean forward guidance treatment (T4). We use the same estimation methodology to
derive this figure as we did for Figure 6.
From Figure 7 it is clear that the theoretical and experimental distributions are once again
strongly consistent with each other. It is also immediate to note that the distributions of
welfare losses are remarkably similar under T1 and T4. We formally test for the equivalence
between these two distributions by using the two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test.
The null hypothesis tested is that the two vectors of welfare losses from the two treatments are
from the same continuous distribution, evaluated against the alternative hypothesis that the
data are from different distributions.29 The null hypothesis is not rejected at very high level
of confidence (p-value of .95), while the same test conducted to compare the distributions
of T1 and T2 strongly rejects the null (p-value of .00). Further robustness checks on sub-
samples of the distributions broken down by precision also confirm the equivalence of the
distributions for T1 and T4. The results of this analysis are in Appendix B.
Both graphical inspection and quantitative results are in agreement in concluding that
the welfare gains of going from T1 to T4 are statistically negligible. The stark monetary
policy implication of this treatment is that the Odyssean forward guidance is not effective
in affecting behavior and reducing welfare losses with an economy populated by rationally
inattentive agents.
4.4 Deterioration of Outlook and Consumption Outcomes
From the optimal theoretical solution in equation (5), dimming economic prospects
captured by an increase in impatience of the private sector – a drop in β – makes investment
a less appealing option for the agents than consuming right away. This change in private
sector sentiment may occur, for instance, after a prolonged expansion when consumers and
businesses sense a slowdown in economic activity. In this case, the model implies that agents
29The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is a nonparametric method which compares the cumulative distribution
functions of two data vectors and is based on the maximum absolute distance between the empirical
distributions of the two samples. It is sensitive to both location and shape of the distributions.
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Figure 8: Comparison between the outlook deterioration treatment (T3) and the baseline
(T1) consumption choices for the first period of the model (c1) made by the theoretical RI
representative agent (left-panel) and by the subjects of the experiment on average (right-
panel), when signal precision 1 is selected. Signal precision 1 identifies a partition of the
r space in two intervals of 16 columns each, as exemplified in Figure 1. Intervals 1 and 2
then correspond to the left-hand side and right-hand side of the partition of the payoff space
respectively.
will increase period 1 consumption relative to the baseline case, while keeping a similar watch
on movements of the interest rate.
We implement this scenario by lowering the discount factor in the computation of the
lifetime utility payoff as explained in Section 3.4. Figure 8 compares the representative
agent’s choice of consumption as predicted by the RI theory with the corresponding average
choice across subjects in the experiment. We report the data for signal precision 1, which
identifies a partition of the r space into two 16-element intervals.
The figure illustrates a remarkable agreement between theory and experiment on the
prediction that a deterioration of the outlook is associated with an increase in precautionary
consumption with respect to risky investment from both the theoretical representative agent
and the average participant. Moreover, as predicted by the theory, participants worried
for future prospects still pay attention to the economic conditions and, specifically, to the
interest rate. As Figure 3 shows, optimal signal precision for this treatment is at least as
high as that for the baseline, on average.
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5 Concluding Remarks
This paper presents a model in which a rationally inattentive representative agent chooses
consumption and savings under uncertainty about the interest rate applied to savings. A
central bank can persuade agents to change consumption behavior in response to changes in
monetary policy.
We consider two changes in policy that relate to forward guidance: a reduction in the
volatility of the interest rate (a form of Delphic forward guidance) and a commitment to
provide an accurate signal on the monetary policy stance (a form of Odyssean forward
guidance). The model predicts that the rationally inattentive agent is not responsive to
Odyssean forward guidance, while Delphic forward guidance offers enough incentive to
modify her consumption behavior. The model also predicts that a deterioration of the
outlook from the agent’s perspective, which may be caused by variations in fiscal rather
than monetary policy, is extremely effective in inducing a change in behavior of the rationally
inattentive agent, resulting in changes in investment behavior in the future.
These theoretical findings are tested in a laboratory experiment. We find that subjects’
choices are consistent with those predicted by the rational inattention model. Moreover, we
show that the predictions of the rational inattention model are more accurate in replicating
subjects’ behavior than those from the full information model, thereby reinforcing the idea
that people behaviors and their changes are better described as coming from limited cognitive
capacity agents than omniscient full information agents.
The experimental and theoretical results are corroborated by the recent and growing
empirical literature on households’ reactions to fiscal and monetary policy. To our knowledge,
this is the first paper that tests in the laboratory the effectiveness of the two forms of forward
guidance as well as of changes in the outlook on the consumption and savings behavior of
individuals.
The paper has three stark policy implications. First, people react to changes in policy
only insofar as those changes represent significant shifts of their utility. Changes that
imply small deviations from the current conditions are not considered worthy of attention
or behavioral responses. Second, a central bank concerned about people’s welfare is best
served by a policy that reduces uncertainty about the interest rate and, as a result, the
economic environment than by a commitment to keep rates predictable. In our theory and
experiment, the commitment to predictable rates, while it might change people’s attention
to monetary policy in general, has no effect on people’s behavior with respect to an economic
environment where this commitment is absent. Third, people’s perception of the outlook
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as it emerges from material changes in the economic environment or fiscal landscape is the
most important trigger of behavioral change.
We believe this last point, especially in light of the difference in attention and behavioral
responses to fiscal and monetary policies uncovered by the recent empirical evidence for the
U.S., constitutes a promising venue for future research.
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Online Appendix
A Further Details About the Model
This Appendix provides some more theoretical details about the RI model used in the
main paper.
The rationally inattentive agent of the model has limited information-processing capacity
to process information about the interest rate. Thus, the agent must decide how much
information to acquire about the interest rate functional to her consumption choices. Specifically,
the agent starts out in period 1 with a prior on the interest rate that has distribution g(r).
She can reduce uncertainty about her prior by acquiring signals on the interest rate as they
relate to her consumption possibilities in period 1. As explained in Section 2 of the paper,
this choice variable is represented by the joint probability p(c1, r).
The optimal choice of the joint distribution depends on the information processing
capacity of the agent. We postulate that the maximum amount of information that she
can extract from consumption about the interest rate is limited by the Shannon’s channel
capacity. Before processing any information, the uncertainty about interest rate can be
expressed by the entropy of the prior on r, H(r) ≡ −E[log2(g(r))]. Since consumption and
interest rate are related in the agent’s decision, knowledge of consumption in period 1 also
provides information about the interest rate. Thus the reduction of uncertainty about the
interest rate that can be achieved through knowledge of consumption can be expressed as
the conditional entropy of interest rate given consumption, H(r|c1).
Shannon’s theory posits that the information flow between the random variables r and
c1, expressed as I(c1, r), is bounded by a number, κ, which represents the maximum amount
of information that can be extracted from c1 about r. In formulae:
I(c1, r) = H(r)−H(r|c1) ≤ κ.
The bound κ is expressed as the number of bits of information that the agent can process
about consumption and interest rate, and poses a limit on the informational content of the
signals that the agent can choose.
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We report the optimization program of the RI agent for convenience below:
max
p(r,c1)
E
{∫
[u(c1) + βu(c2)]p(ct, wt)µ(dc1, dr)|I1
}
(A1)
s.t. κ = I(p(c1, r)) (A2)
c2 = r(1− c1) (A3)
p(c1, r) ∈ D(w, c) (A4)
g(r) given (A5)
D(r, c) in constraint (A4) restricts the choice of the agent to be drawn from the set of possibile
distributions, while µ(·) is the Dirac measure that accounts for potential discreteness in the
optimal choice of p(c, r).
The program in (A1)-(A5) can be solved by Lagrangian methods. Let θ indicate the
Lagrange multiplier associated with constraint (A2), which can be interpreted as the shadow
cost of processing information. Then the total cost of choosing a signal of information content
κ is given by θκ. We postulate an environment with elastic capacity on agents’ information-
processing. That is, for a given marginal cost of processing information, θ, the agent chooses
a signal that conveys the optimal amount of information, as determined by the informational
content of p(c1, r).
The program in equations (A1)-(A5) is a well-posed convex problem, but with state and
control variables that are infinite dimensional. The solution to this specific 2-period model
can be characterized analytically as:
p∗ (c, r) = g (r)
(
e(θ+
u(C)
θ
ln 2) − 1
)
, (A6)
where u (C) = u (c1)+β(u (c2)) – from which the closed form solution in (5) is then obtained
for the utility functional form assumed in the paper.
The optimal joint distribution in (A6) illustrates how the solution depends on the shadow
cost of processing information, θ, the prior distribution of interest rate, g(r), and the
functional form of the lifetime utility, u(C).
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B Forward Guidance: Further Results and Robustness
Checks
B.1 Consumption in Theory and Experimental Data
B.1.1 Delphic Forward Guidance
Figure A1 compares first period consumption choices for the Delphic forward guidance
treatment (T2) with the baseline (T1) for the theoretical RI solution described in equation
(5) of Section 2 of the paper (left panel) and the experimental average across subjects (right
panel). We consider the choices made when signal precision level 1 is selected, for which we
have a sufficiently large number of observations to conduct this exercise for an individual
precision. As illustrated in Figure 1 of the paper, signal precision 1 identifies a partition
of the r space into two intervals of 16 columns each. Intervals 1 and 2 in the figure then
correspond to the left-hand side and right-hand side of the partition of the payoff space
respectively.
The figure shows that this form of forward guidance makes subjects more deliberate
in their investment decisions when the interest rate drawn is low, as they decrease period 1
consumption with respect to the baseline in interval 1, while they switch to more conservative
choices than in the baseline treatment for higher draws of the interest rate in interval 2.
Consistent with the theory, by decreasing the volatility of the monetary policy rate, Delphic
forward guidance allows the agents to track more precisely the interest rate for a given
optimal information choice. As a result, they adjust their consumption/savings in line with
the prevailing policy rate.
The change in slope of the profile of c1 from T1 to T2 in Figure A1 for both RI theory
and experimental data reflects the fact that empirically the shrinkage of the volatility from
T1 to T2 is implemented by changing the support of the interest rate from [0.4 − 1.3] to
[0.7− 1]. As a result, low values of r correspond to lower values of c1 in T2 than in T1, since
the return to savings when r is low in T2 are still on average higher tahn the corresponding
return on savings in T1. Likewise, when r is in the upper side of the interest rate partition,
the return to savings are lower in T2 than they are in T1 (the maximum value for T2 is 1 as
opposite to 1.3 in T1), which explains why for both the RI theory and experimental data,
the slope of c1 is flatter in T2 than it is in T1 in Interval 2 of the figure.
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B.1.2 Odyssean Forward Guidance
The comparison of consumption choices between an economy with Odyssean forward
guidance (T4) and the baseline (T1) is documented in Figure A2 for the theoretical RI
representative agent (left panel) and the average subject (right panel) when the precision
level 1 signal is selected. The figure shows a remarkable consistency of the theoretical and
empirical results. In particular, a commitment of the central bank to announce the policy
stance (high vs. low interest rate) with 90% accuracy before agents process more information
has no effect on the consumption behavior of either the representative RI agent or the average
experimental subject: they both select the consumption they would have chosen without the
central bank’s signal.
B.2 Precision and Welfare for the Odyssean Forward Guidance
To shed further light on how the Odyssean forward guidance treatment affects subjects’
choices and behavior, we look at participants’ decisions of precision next. Figure A3 illustrates
the scatte pplot of the average precision chosen by a subject in T1 vs. T4. For each
subject, two averages are calculated. One corresponds to the decisions taken after receiving
a central bank clue for tight monetary policy stance (r in the top half of the support), and
is represented by red dots. The second is for the decisions taken after receiving a clue for
loose monetary policy (r in the bottom half of the support), and is denoted by green dots.
Figure A3 illustrates two main observations. First, participants do not systematically
modify their information acquisition according to whether the monetary policy stance is
tight or loose, as the lack of a clear pattern of changes in information gathering from T1 to
T4 in response to high and low interest rates shows.
Second, the figure also suggests that the decision to change information gathering might
be triggered by their cognitive ability. Subjects comfortable with processing very little
information in T1 (precision ≤ 1) treat the signal as a new prior where the tracking of the
interest rate is made easier by the shrinkage of the support from 32 values to 16 values with
90% probability.30 For these low-cognitive capacity subjects, the Odyssean forward guidance
treatment elicits a modest increase in attention and cognitive effort in tracking the monetary
policy instrument from T1 to T4.
On the contrary, for people who select relatively more informative signals in T1 (precision
30We chose precision 1 as cut-off point because the central banks signal conveys information on whether
the interest rate is in the top or bottom half of its support, which is effectively equivalent to a signal of
precision 1, with 90% probability.
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Figure A1: Comparison between the Delphic forward guidance treatment, (T2), and the
baseline (T1) consumption choices for the first period of the model (c1) made by the
theoretical RI representative agent (left-panel) and by the subjects of the experiment on
average (right-panel), when signal precision 1 is selected. Signal precision 1 identifies a
partition of the r space in two intervals of 16 columns each, as exemplified in Figure 1 of
the paper. Intervals 1 and 2 then correspond to the left-hand side and right-hand side of the
partition of the payoff space respectively.
Figure A2: Comparison between the Odyssean forward guidance treatment, (T4), and the
baseline (T1) consumption choices for the first period of the model (c1) made by the
theoretical RI representative agent (left-panel) and by the subjects of the experiment on
average (right-panel), when signal precision 1 is selected. Signal precision 1 identifies a
partition of the r space in two intervals of 16 columns each, as exemplified in Figure 1 of
the paper. Intervals 1 and 2 then correspond to the left-hand side and right-hand side of the
partition of the payoff space respectively.
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Figure A3: Average precision by subject in T1 vs. T4. Each dot represents the average
precision chosen by an individual. For each subject, the average is calculated across
realizations of the signal that r is high (top half of the support of r) in red, or low (bottom
half of the support of r) in green.
>1), the central bank’s signal on the policy stance provides a mild incentive to lower their
attention to the interest rate. While their chosen signal is still more informative than the
one provided by the monetary authority, they marginally drop the precision of their optimal
signal following the announcement. Since our model’s testable predictions are focused mostly
on behavioral outcomes induced by information gathering, rather than the information
gathered before the decisions are made per se, we leave a more detailed investigation of
these patterns for future research.31
The litmus test of whether this form of Odyssean forward guidance is successful in
modifying the economic behavior of the subjects, however, ultimately rests on the ability of
the policy to affect macro aggregates, such as consumption and investment and, as a result,
welfare. In Figure A4, hence, we decompose the bottom panel of Figure 7 of the paper by
splitting subjects by their precision level acquired in T1. The top panel shows the kernel
31These changes in information gathering could also simply be due to some statistical noise. However,
evidence on the potential for forward guidance to increase private sector’s uncertainty in the U.S. and cross-
country have been recently documented by, among the others, Ehrmann et al. (2019).
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Figure A4: Kernel density estimate of welfare loss as percentage of full information for
subjects who chose precision > 1 in T1 (top panel) and subjects who chose precision ≤ 1
in T1 (bottom panel). Red-solid lines are for T4, while blue-dashed line are for T1. The
aggregate densities are estimated using a Gaussian kernel.
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density estimation of welfare loss for subjects with signal precision > 1, while the bottom
panel shows the density for subjects with precision ≤ 1.32 For both panels, solid red lines
indicate the density in T4, whereas dashed blue lines show the corresponding density in T1.
As for the overall case in Figure 7, the differences in the estimated distributions for the
two treatments appear quite small for the two sub-grups as well. We corroborate this visual
intuition by formally test for the equivalence of the distributions with two-sample KS tests.
The KS test shows that the null hypothesis of equality between T1’s and T4’s distributions
cannot be respectively rejected at level of confidence of 76% for subjects whose precision in
T1 is > 1 and .99% for those with T1 precision ≤ 1.
Next, we test whether the distributions retain the same variance between the two treatments
for each group to make sure that the change in information acquisition, albeit marginal,
have not affected the spread of the distributions. To account for non-Gaussianity of the
underlying generating process of the data, we use the Levene’s test. The null hypothesis of
the test is that the two population variances are homoscedastic; the alternative is that they
are heteroscedastic. We cannot reject the hypothesis for either group (p-values are .71 for
the precision > 1 group and .81 for the precision ≤1 one, respectively).
Finally, we employ the non-parametric Wilconox’s signed-rank test to compare the medians
of the distributions. The null hypothesis of this test is that the difference between the paired
observations of the T1 and T4 samples for each subgroup follows a symmetric distribution
around zero. Once again, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of equality of the median
at very high levels of confidence (p-values of .69 for the first group and .66 for the second,
respectively).33
32The numbers of subjects in the two groups are 30 for precision>1 and 21 for the precision≤ 1 respectively.
33The more commonly used F- and t- tests for equality of variance and mean of two samples strongly rely
on the assumptions of Gaussianity of the data, which are void in our case.
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C Instructions for the Laboratory Experiment
After you read these instructions you will go through a 10 minute practice phase.  The practice 
phase will not impact your payoff at all.  It is designed to help you understand the choices you 
are making before you begin the paid phases of the experiment.  After the practice phase you 
will have a chance to go back through the directions before beginning the paid phases.      
If you have a question at any point, please raise your hand, but …   
How you use your time is an important factor in how much money you can earn, so it is best to 
ask any questions while the instructions are on your screen because the experiment cannot be 
paused during the active phases of it.   
 
Phases of the Study 
You will complete 4 paid phases that each last about 10 minutes.  Each phase is a little different 
and you will read specific instructions before completing each phase.  What you do in one 
phase will have no bearing on what happens in another phase.  The amount you will be paid is 
based on the sum of what you earn in each phase.  Monetary amounts in the study are denoted 
in Lab Dollars which are converted into $US at the rate 100 Lab Dollars = $US 1.    
 
 
 
Periods and Payoffs in a Phase 
Each paid phase is comprised of a series of periods.  In each and every period you will pick a 
prize card and earn money.  Prize cards work exactly like the ones in the practice you just went 
through.   
Your prize each period will be added to the running total for that phase and a new period will 
begin automatically once your prize is revealed for the previous period.    
There is a limit to the number of periods you can complete in a phase, but you do not know 
what that limit is and it can differ phase to phase.  The more periods you complete, the more 
opportunities you have to earn money so you do not want to waste time during a phase.    
NOTE:  The only way you earn money is selecting a prize card (clicking on a row heading) and 
then confirming your choice.     
The prize cards do not change period to period within a phase, but may be different in different 
phases.      
 
General 
Directions
Practice 
Phase
General 
Directions
Phase A
Decisions 
$A
Phase C
Decisions
$C
Phase D
Decisions
$D
Payment
$A+$B+$C+$D
You are here
Introduction
Phase B
Decisions 
$B
Prize Card
Practice
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Hints about what Ball is Drawn 
The prize ball is actually drawn before you choose your prize card.  But the draw is not revealed 
to you until after you pick a prize card.  However, you can get a hint about the ball that has 
been drawn.   
To get a hint you have to correctly solve logic puzzles.  The harder the puzzles you solve, the 
more accurate the hint you will receive.  How logic puzzles work is explained below.   
You can narrow the range of balls and thus possible prize amounts to a group of 16 by solving 
easy puzzles.  In this case you would be informed either that the ball drawn is numbered 
between 1 and 16 or that the ball drawn is numbered between 17 and 32.  That is you are told 
if it is the first group of 16 or the second group of 16.  The way the hint is displayed on your 
screen is that prizes associated with balls in the group that does not contain the drawn ball are 
grayed out on every prize card.  Prizes associated with balls in the group that does contain the 
ball that was drawn are highlighted in yellow on every prize card.   
You can narrow the size of the group down to 8 balls (balls 1-8, balls 9-16, balls 17-24, or balls 
25-32) by solving slightly harder puzzles, a group of 4 balls by moderately harder puzzles, a 
group of 2 balls by solving very hard problems, or even to a single ball by solving really hard 
puzzles.   
As you will see, the puzzles can be time consuming.  So you face a tradeoff of  
getting a more specific hint so you can increase what you expect to earn the current 
period &  
getting a more vague hint and completing more periods  
 
Returning to the previous example with only 5 prize cards and 8 balls, if you got the hint that 
the range for the prize ball that was drawn was between 1 and 4 then your screen would look 
like this: 
 
1
2
3
4
5
2
4
6
8
1
3
5
8
7
2
4
6
7
6
3
5
7
6
5
4
6
7
5
4
5
7
6
4
3
6
8
5
3
2
7
6
4
2
1
8
Prize 
Cards
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Possible Prizes in Yellow
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Notice that the prizes for balls 5 through 8 are grayed out.  This is how you know that the ball 
that has been drawn is not in that range.  If you were to pick card 2 your prize is equally likely to 
be 2, 3, 4, or 5.  If you were to pick card 4, your prize is equally likely to be 6, 8, 7, or 6.  Notice 
that card 4 has a higher prize than card 2 for all four of the balls that could be drawn so in this 
case picking card 4 would always earn you more money than card 2.  But card 5 would earn 
more than card 4 if ball 1 was drawn.  In general, the more accurate your hint, the better able 
you are to pick the card that will pay you the most money that period.  But getting more 
accurate hints takes time and means that you can complete fewer periods  
 
TIME PENATLY:  If you do not get a hint that narrows the number of balls down to something 
less than 32, then you will have to wait 60 seconds before starting the next period.  Keep in mind 
that you only have about 10 minutes in each phase and that your earnings are the sum of the 
prizes you earn and you only earn one prize each period.   
 
MULTIPLE HINTS:  If you successfully get a hint, you can then try to get an even more accurate 
hint.  But you do not have to have to work your way up to a more accurate hint.  That is, if you 
want to narrow the range down to 4 balls, you can go straight to that level rather than first 
narrowing it down to 16 then 8 then 4.  Generally, it is better to decide how accurate of a hint 
you want and go straight to that option, keeping in mind that more accurate hints are harder to 
achieve.     
 
FAILURE to get HINT:  If you have not successfully gotten a hint in the period, it is as if you are 
just starting the period.  You can make a choice without getting a hint, but you would incur the 
60 second penalty or you can try to get a hint.  If you have already successfully received a hint 
during the period, but failed to get a more accurate hint, it is as if you just receive the hint you 
already had.  You can either pick a prize card or try to get a more accurate hint.   
 
Logic Puzzles 
The logic puzzles involve a 3-by-3 table of images, with the image that belongs in the lower 
right missing.  To solve the logic puzzle you have to identify the image that completes the table 
from the multiple choice options provided.   
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The images have six characteristics:  shape, size, color, orientation, border style, and border 
corner style.  These characteristics can change by row ,  column , diagonal 
,  reverse diagonal , corner , or reverse corner . 
Below is an example of a logic puzzle. 
 
In this example, the shape is the same in each image as is the color, size, and border corner.   
But the border changes along the reverse diagonal.  The orientation changes with the corner - 
the image is turned in the same direction for everything in the top left (above the diagonal) of 
the table.        
Given this, the correct answer from the choices below is “D” because it has a dashed border 
and the correct orientation while all of its other characteristics match those of the other images 
in the table.  Notice that A has circles for border corners.  B is the wrong size – it is too large.  C 
has the wrong shape.  E is oriented the wrong way.  F is the wrong color.  G and H both have the 
wrong border.   
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Summary 
1. There are 4 paid phases that each last about 10 minutes.  You are paid based on the sum 
of your earnings in all four phases.   
2. During a period the computer will draw a prize ball numbered 1 – 32, but you will not 
observe this draw until after you pick a prize card.  
3. You will earn the prize associated with the ball drawn for the prize card you pick.  
4. Before you pick a prize card, you can get a hint about what prize ball was drawn by 
solving logic puzzles.   
a. A more accurate hint requires you to solve harder puzzles.    
b. You can select an accuracy level at any point. 
5. There is an unknown limit to the number of periods you can complete in a phase, but if 
you do not successfully get a hint that narrows the range of the drawn ball down to 
something less than 32, then you will have to wait 60 seconds to start the next period. 
 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand.  Otherwise, you can click __Start__ to 
go to the ten minute unpaid practice phase.  After the practice phase ends you will have a 
chance to reread the instructions before starting the paid phases.    
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